12 Αυγούστου, 2009 § 2 Σχόλια
» The late Panayiotis Kondylis, Greece’s sole real modern strategist, was the only voice that brutally and publicly demolished accepted Greek illusions about a national security model exclusively depended on the imaginary willingness of others to provide the level of protection Greece is unable to provide for herself. In his Theory of War (1997) Kondylis warned that Greek troubles with Turkey emanated from the fundamental strategic error of Greece convincing herself that Turkey perceives EU membership with the same singular fervor as that permeating Greek political and economic elites — or, that Greece’s European partners are fundamentally committed to solidarity with Greece against Turkish actions come hell or high water.
These and other erroneous premises on the part of a country that fails to stand on her own two feet, and expects other to do what she cannot fulfill in her own defense, Kondylis argued, will mathematically result in the «European-ization» of Turkey working as the ironic lever of turning Greece into a permanent satellite of the Euro-Asian, neo-Ottoman Turkish great power through a protracted process of European-Turkish negotiation in which (a) Turkey makes constant demands for preferential interpretation of accession criteria and (b) the Europeans, in wishing not to slam the door in Turkey’s face but, at the same time, unwilling to openly water down EU criteria, choose the convenient outlet of offering «incentives» to Ankara at the expense of a submissive, but wholly «European,» Greece.
Kondylis’ conception carries a frightening logic that is confirmed in practice with each passing day. »
ΠΗΓΗ: Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), 02.08.2009. Πλήρες κείμενο